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LAND – GOLD – REFORM The Territorial Restructuring of Guatemala's Highlands

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INTRODUCTION

Many of the current critiques of the World Bank’s “market-assisted” programs for land reform center on the contradictions between the Bank’s neo-liberal agrarian discourse and the poor distributive results of its projects on the ground (Sauer, Schwartzman, Barrios 2003; Dias Martins 2005). Taking the Bank to task for the inconsistency between its mission to alleviate rural poverty and the regressive nature of its land reform programs is important, not only because it can help amplify the voices of the landless, but because it helps expose the inherent hypocrisies in the Bank’s non-distributive approach to economic growth and rural development, overall.

However, these critiques do not necessarily shed light on why the Bank continually implements these failed programs with such insistence. Simply pointing to the “Washington Consensus” does not provide a specific understanding of the role of market-based land reform within the Bank’s national development strategies. Without a structural analysis of the Bank’s agenda, it is difficult to understand the political scope of its land reform programs. Further, it is important to consider the Bank’s *suite* of policies and projects in a particular country in order to know what role land reform (or lack of it) might play in the Bank’s overall strategy. A market-based land reform project may be an agrarian failure for the peasantry, yet still be quite successful in terms of helping restructure the social and economic institutions in a country’s hinterlands in favor of agribusiness, tourism, or extractive industries, for example.

This chapter will argue that in order to construct viable, broad-based resistance strategies that engage the Bank on rural and agrarian issues, one has to understand what the Bank is really doing on the ground, rather than what it appears to be doing. In the case of Guatemala, as in other parts of Latin America, the World Bank’s program for market-led land reform complements its strategy for opening the Western Highlands to extractive industries. While indigenous and agrarian movements do discursive battle with the World Bank’s market-led land reform programs, Bank-driven projects favoring foreign mining interests have unleashed a much more thorough and socio-environmentally destructive transformation of indigenous lands. To understand this process, I will introduce *territorial restructuring* as a critical development concept, along with its supplementary components: the *development hyperspace* and the *mineshed*.

The Bank’s portfolio of development projects in any given country are a reflection of its operations to assist capital in capturing particular markets and rents for privileged firms and political actors at national and sub-national, or—*territorial*—scales. Many of the Bank’s projects must be understood in

terms of restructuring territorial spaces and places to favor selected forms of capital, particular firms, and/or key political actors. In this analysis, *places* refers to the physical areas where production and restructuring happens (for example, the mineral-rich, indigenous Highlands of Guatemala.) *Spaces* are the socio-political arenas in which different actors vie for power over those spaces, e.g. the market, policy, and governance structures.

Territorial restructuring seeks control over the places and spaces where surplus is produced by shaping and controlling the institutions and social relations that govern production, extraction and accumulation. This control includes, but is not limited to, different forms of national and sub-national governance. As is the case with neo-liberal reforms, control can also be exercised by *limiting* formal governance in order to allow unfettered access to resources by foreign firms. It is not necessary for the Bank, private firms, or national governments to achieve consensus on the process of territorial restructuring. The ways in which these institutions use Development to re-define and control territory depend much on their separate, frequently complimentary interests. The accumulated result of the activities, tensions, and alliances between these different actors results in the restructuring of national spaces and places, e.g., the markets and municipalities, farms, forests, and roads that make up the local institutions and landscapes. In the process, territorial restructuring encounters friction, slippage, and resistance, all of which may result in unexpected outcomes for the Bank, the government, or the firm. Effective resistance to territorial restructuring in favor of indigenous livelihoods, or redistributive land reform, requires not only unmasking the primary capital interests behind the Bank's rural development strategies, but also identifying the inherent fissures in its alliances.

Setting aside the Bank's development discourse¹ for the moment, the governing structure of the World Bank ensures that its operations privilege the "development" of northern capital. In order to facilitate the business interests of the corporations that support its lending member governments (the G-8), the Bank must create stable conditions for the production and extraction of wealth from nation-states in the global South where conditions are socially, politically or economically unstable. This task—not the same as working to stabilize these nation states *per se*—is accomplished by restructuring conditions not only at national, but territorial scales, where foreign direct investment actually takes place.

¹ "Our Mission: To fight poverty with passion and professionalism for lasting results. To help people help themselves and their environment by providing resources, sharing knowledge, building capacity and forging partnerships in the public and private sectors."
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20040565~menuPK:1696892~pagePK:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html>

The World Bank's lending in Guatemala is an example in which land reform, environmental projects, and infrastructure projects are all part of a bundle of institutional and financial interventions that favor the development of foreign-based extractive industries in the country's Western Highlands. While the Bank's projects for land reform and environmental services fail in their own, stated terms, the Bank's overall package of projects and policies succeed in establishing a beach head for extractive industries in the Highlands. At the same time the Bank's public lending was promoting market-assisted land reform, its private sector lending arm was helping Glamis Gold Ltd., a Canadian-American corporation, to re-open the *Marlin* mine in the Department of San Marcos. Reactivated in spite of local protests by indigenous communities, the mine will open up the Highlands to gold, nickel—and soon—uranium operations.²

The World Bank's land reform projects need to be considered as part of a more comprehensive trend towards *territorial re-structuring*. Engaging with the Bank over its market-assisted land reform programs—when the thrust of territorial restructuring is the expansion of the mining sector—may not be the most effective way to conserve the environment, protect the interests of indigenous communities, or even to advance re-distributive agrarian reform. An understanding of the nature of territorial re-structuring is important for analyzing the significance of the Bank's land reform programs, for reading the structural threats to peasant livelihoods in the countryside, and for formulating effective territorial strategies for engagement or resistance.

LAND REFORM AND TERRITORIAL CONTROL

“Private, legalized state-sanctioned claims over property... can make the rural economy ‘secure’ for investments; [these investments will] in turn lead to economic growth, and ... to poverty eradication”

(World Bank, 2003: xix, in (Borras Jr. 2006).

In Latin America today, market-driven land reform schemes aim to establish formal property rights. Historically, these have been biased towards individual rather than communal or collective holdings. But the concern on the ground is not just the social form of titling, but how power over production is allocated and how surplus is distributed. According to Borras (2006:125) *redistributive* land reform is

² “The project is viewed by the mining industry as a test of the Guatemalan mining investment environment. Its commercial success should encourage new investment in the country and the sector.” (IFC, 2004:4)

“actual and effective control of the ‘nature, pace, extent, and direction of surplus production and extraction from the land and the disposition of such surplus” from the landed elite to the peasantry.

But to have land and to control the flow and accumulation of surplus is to control *territory*. Structural conditions determine the forms and influence the types of production, and channel the flow and accumulation of surplus within territories. Regressive policies (and projects) can bring about structural changes that diminish or transfer territorial control over resources from landed poor and indigenous communities to powerful elites or to foreign interests.ⁱ

Territorial re-structuring involves the negotiation, adjustment and relocation of costs and benefits of surplus production, following a “logic of territory” and “logic of capital.” (Harvey 2003). The first logic includes activities such as privatization, environmental enclosures, and agrarian reforms, while the second may utilize the instruments of investment, market liberalization, dispossession, etc. The former is concerned with *place*, the latter with *space*. Land reform, of course, is only one means of appropriating or restructuring territory. Because of the weak planning and regulatory capacity of many southern nation-states, infrastructure—roads, electricity, or power generation—are also primary means for organization and control.

Because the appropriation of surplus is often in dispute—inter-nationally and intra-nationally—attempts at land reform must be understood within the context of competing projects for territorial control. Land reform carried out within the context of regressive territorial restructuring may or may not achieve its stated distributive results, or may end up being abandoned altogether. Movements for re-distributive agrarian reform and sustainable and equitable land use must consider the interplay between official land reform programs and the array of projects & policies that influence structural conditions and determine control over territory. The World Bank, of course, is the main global institution responsible for setting structural conditions at both national and sub-national scales.

THE STRUCTURAL CONTEXT AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE INSTITUTIONS

Capitalism’s “condition of overproduction” directly shapes the structural context at global scales. It is characterized by excessive surplus extraction and cyclical crises of capital accumulation, in which the formation and concentration of capital finds itself without available opportunities for re-investment and/or corresponding market capacity to consume the goods being produced. Following a twenty year trend of massive capital accumulation, global financial institutions are presently faced with the

problem of paying out large amounts of interest on their liquid assets. These institutions must lend extensively to shift the burden of "excess liquidity" to borrowers.

This lending opens up opportunities, particularly in activities with quick, high, but risky returns, such as the extractive industries.³ The opportunities to invest and extract are both facilitated and limited by current investment environments in the Global South. On one hand the gutting of southern states through IMF-World Bank structural adjustment programs (SAPs) over the last two decades has left governments weak and unable to provide political, social, and financial guarantees to foreign investors. On the other hand, this has also made them dependent on foreign investment for their survival as states, and thus vulnerable to agreements skewed in favor of foreign companies. Because of the political and economic risks involved in exploiting these opportunities, companies and financial institutions turn to international finance institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank and the regional development banks (e.g., the Inter-American Development Bank—IDB), to provide the essential financial, political, and social guarantees for their investments.ⁱⁱ

Thanks to their powerful, multilateral nature, the IFIs are able to force weak borrowing governments to modify their investment and regulatory frameworks to favor foreign investors. Importantly, unlike private banks, the IFIs are also able to directly shape structural conditions at the national and sub-national level. The main IFIs have two separate lending arms—private and public—in order to accomplish the job. At the World Bank Group, the International Finance Corporation—IFC, provides loans to the private sector, while the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—IBRD, provides loans to governments. The same people on the Bank's Board of Directors approving the projects for governmental reform, infrastructure, environment, and health, also approve the IFC's loans to private sector projects in which the Bank, not infrequently, has an equity interest. Likening the IBRD and IFC to a hand and sickle, a peasant leader once commented, "What the Bank cultivates with one hand, it harvests with the other."

³ In the case of the Marlin Mine, for example, Glamis' total operating costs are only \$121/ounce (IFC, 2004). Using the current average world gold prices (approximately \$650/oz), this provides the company with a return on their investment of 437 % (!)

THE CASE OF GUATEMALA

In Guatemala, the development of extractive industries is influenced by a weak post-bellum nation state (tightly controlled by a powerful and victorious elite), and by extraordinarily high gold prices on the international market.

In the first case, the government of Oscar Berger's *GANA* coalition party successfully campaigned on a platform of economic growth through "regional integration," i.e., Plan Puebla -Panama and DR-CAFTA.⁴ The withering of the former initiative, and the inability of the latter to produce social benefits in the near to medium-term future, has compelled Berger (as the two presidents before him) to turn to the country's mineral resources as a source of revenue and political power. But in Guatemala, thirty-six years of civil war had driven most companies from the countryside. Reviving the sector was a remote possibility until 2001-04 when the international price for gold jumped from \$277 to over \$400 an ounce (Solano 2005).

According to the IFC, the rise in gold prices is largely due to "(The) weak dollar, low real interest rates, low economic growth, heightened geopolitical risk, falling mine production, reduced hedging by most producers, and equity market uncertainty" (IFC, 2004:13). Add to this the exploding demand among India and China's rapidly expanding upper-middle classes. Old, low-grade, mined-out, or hard to reach mines around the world have suddenly become potentially profitable. In Guatemala, these deposits are found in the Western Highlands, home to most of the county's impoverished indigenous population.

For decades the Highlands was the theater to the most widespread and grisly episodes of government and para-military human rights abuses. After the signing of the country's Peace Accords in 1996, the World Bank quickly advised the Arzú government of Guatemala to modernize its mining sector. This led to one of the most draconian mining codes since the Spanish Conquest. Under the new mining law, companies are not only 100% foreign owned, the former 6% mandatory royalty levels were replaced with a mere 1%, and the 58% tax on profits was reduced to 31%. In a country where poor consumers pay up to \$140 a month for water, the substantial quantities of water needed for processing

⁴ The PPP—Plan Puebla Panama, is a regional integration initiative among the countries of Central America and Mexico's nine south-eastern states. PPP was launched in Mexico in 2001. DR-CAFTA—The Central America-Dominican Republic -United States Free Trade Agreement, was signed in the U.S. on August 5, 2004.

gold ore are free to mining companies.⁵ Licensing was streamlined, and though some environmental regulations were strengthened, no provisions were made to increase the regulatory capacity of the ministries of Mining or Environment, thus making these improvements effectively symbolic.

The Bank and the present Berger government rationalize this “race to the bottom” by insisting that these concessions will attract new investment into a politically risky sector. In this view, sometime in the future, the benefits of mining will lead to economic and social development. But this argument is based on the assumption that the high price of gold and the country’s ore reserves will hold out long enough to actually build up a national industry after the foreign mining companies concessions expire, twenty years from now. Although gold has presently jumped to over US \$650/oz, the gold boom won’t last forever. Currencies will stabilize, demand will top off, and the International Monetary Fund—that currently holds over \$40 billion in gold reserves—may sell its bullion on the international market in order to deal with its own financial crisis, thus dropping the international price and making low-grade mines unprofitable again. By then, foreign corporation will have made their profits and will likely pull out, leaving the leftovers to national companies, and the environmental clean-up to Guatemalan taxpayers—or worse, local villagers. Clearly, the World Bank’s support for gold mining in Guatemala is a short-term strategy for intensive extraction, one that requires not only direct manipulation of the country’s regulatory framework, but extensive control over the territorial structures in the Western Highlands in order to guarantee efficient—if predatory—surplus extraction.

LAND REFORM IN THE MINE-SHED: THE PEOPLE, THE COUNTRYSIDE, THE PROJECTS

Control over land and labor, as well as the mitigation of social, political and environmental conflicts, is an essential condition for extractive industries, and therefore a primary objective of the Bank’s territorial restructuring. The mining industry’s territorial influence in the Highlands extends over the *area of extraction* (minerals and water), as well as over an *area of influence* (land and labor markets, roads, timber, etc.). In effect, the manipulation of space and place through territorial restructuring both prepares and is shaped by activities taking place within a *mine-shed* that constitutes both the industry’s socio-economic and political *foothold*, and its environmental *footprint*. In the mine-shed, land, labor, capital and environmental services flow towards, and are affected by, mining activities. The mine-shed is not distributive; resources flowing to the mine are not reciprocated with wealth flowing back to the Highlands. The privileging of mining interests “structures in” the sector’s access

⁵ Glamis’ Marlin mine will use 577,000 m³ of water a year (IFC, 2004)

to resources, and “structures out” any significant repatriation or distribution of profits. It also structures out any serious alternative or sustainable development strategies that might improve rural livelihoods, thus exacerbating the deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the Highland countryside. Thus, while some resources in the mine-shed (like land, water and electricity) flow towards the mine, others (like rural labor) flow out of the countryside altogether. Without effective mitigation measures, mining will directly and indirectly drain the Highlands of its natural and human resources.⁶

Thus, it is no coincidence that the mine-shed in the Western Highlands maps cleanly with the areas of influence of the Bank’s projects for infrastructure, economic development, environmental services, and land reform. It also maps with the majority of the country’s primarily agricultural, poor, indigenous populations—the same communities that were devastated by the civil war.

FROM COUNTRY ASSISTANCE STRATEGIES TO TERRITORIAL RESTRUCTURING

While Guatemala has the largest economy in Central America it also has one of the highest degrees of inequality in all of Latin America, with the second-worst Gini coefficient (0.57) on the continent. Poverty is concentrated in the country’s rural areas and within indigenous communities, who account for over half of the population in the countryside.⁷ In the densely-populated Western Highlands, indigenous people of various Mayan groups (Kiché, Kaq’chikel, Mam, and Q’eqchi) make up from 57% to 90% of the population. Nearly seventy percent of the Highland’s inhabitants are rural, poor, or extremely poor. Over half of the population makes a living through subsistence agriculture (World Bank 2005).

The World Bank’s current \$255-million portfolio in Guatemala is disbursed through its public sector “social” investment arm (IBRD) in areas of education; nutrition and maternal/child health; local and rural development (including environment); land administration; and public sector management. The private sector arms of the Bank (IFC and MIGA) “complement IBRD lending for policy and institutional changes ... through investments and technical assistance in banking/insurance, infrastructure, extractive industries, manufacturing... and the value-added export sectors” (*Ibid*, 2005:25). The IFC has \$139 million in its Guatemalan portfolio.

⁶ The Marlin Mine uses 7 km² of land, 15.3 MW of electricity and 577,000 m³/yr of water (IFC, 2004).

⁷ Rural population- 61%; indigenous-39%; poor-74%; extremely poor- 24%; illiterate- 43%; indigenous peoples in the rural areas- 80% (52% of the population)

According to the World Bank, since the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996, the Government of Guatemala (GoG) has renewed its focus on rural programs. The Bank supports the Guatemalan president Oscar Berger’s economic reactivation plan, *Vamos Guatemala!*, the three components of which (*Guate Solidaria Rural*, *Guate-Invierte*, *Registro Información Catastral*) are seen by the Bank as able to make an impact on poverty and strengthen the Secretariat of Agrarian Affairs (*Ibid*).

Vamos Guatemala! and the World Bank’s portfolio intend to open the countryside to the recently approved DR-CAFTA to “provide opportunities for accelerating development and growth in Guatemala—including through attracting new investment to the country...” In a candid passage of its Country Assistance Strategy—CAS,⁸ the World Bank states that indigenous farmers dependent on “sensitive agricultural commodities” (i.e., those cultivating basic grains for subsistence) will need help in “technological upgrading, crop substitution or assistance in moving out of agriculture, complemented by actions to spur the development of deeper financial markets... Deficiencies in Guatemalan infrastructure such as road networks... need to be addressed to reap the potential gains of DR-CAFTA” (World Bank 2005:26).

To assist the penetration of DR-CAFTA, the Bank argues for increasing access to productive assets and rural infrastructure accompanied by “demand-generation” activities concentrated in the Western Highlands. Ostensibly, the Highlands are targeted because their condition of high poverty rates and high poverty densities offer the best opportunity for positive development impacts. However, the Highlands are territorially strategic in terms of labor markets, agribusiness, environmental services, and minerals. Among other foci, the Bank’s strategy specifically identifies “decentralized management with a *territorial focus*” (emphasis mine).

The Bank recommends associating infrastructure programs with the provision of financing (micro-credit) and technical assistance in order to develop local industries and micro-enterprises, through “packaging” at the territorial level and also through identified policy interventions, such as the passage of a water law.

⁸ The CAS is the general blueprint for Bank operations at the national scale. Sometimes the CAS is discussed in the borrowing country’s parliament or congress. Occasionally, civil society organizations are invited to comment on the CAS. But, importantly, the CAS is typically formulated *after* the “conditional loans” (loans conditioned on structural adjustment measures) have already been agreed upon between the Bank and the government at the cabinet level, thus exempting the Bank’s primary structural interventions from congressional scrutiny or public discussion.

As a national strategy document, the CAS frames the policy environment in which specific Bank projects will be implemented by setting the terms and general objectives of Bank-financed development. But in and of itself, the CAS is not sufficient to determine what actually gets done on the ground. Despite the World Bank's market-led rhetoric, government-sponsored projects financed by the Bank (itself a public institution) are necessary to advance the interests of private international capital. Because they incur national debt, these projects are frequently voted on in national congresses or parliaments. The potential impacts or consequences of these projects often conflict with influential private and state sector interests in borrowing country governments. While the Bank's projects for tax reform, land reform, or environmental services all help international finance capital "drill down" from the de-regulatory heights of DR-CAFTA to specific investment opportunities at the sub-national level, these projects sometimes run counter to the interests of national elites unwilling to acquire national debt for projects that reduce their rents (such as tax reform), or undermine their control over resources (such as land reform), that may favor certain enclaves over others, or simply may not provide interesting enough opportunities for rent-seeking behavior. Thus, the negotiations over projects often reflect national-international and intra-national disputes over rents and resources at territorial scales.

The geography of the Bank's territorial approach is loosely defined by a physical area layered with overlapping projects and circumscribed by regional trade agreements and a national policy framework. The convergence of national policies, Bank projects, and regional agreements at a sub-national scale produces a development arena or "hyperspace" in which powerful capitals edge out weaker or unconsolidated capitals for access to resources and the extraction of wealth. The institutional or *spatial* creation of this hyperspace in turn defines the geographic area (place) in which territorial restructuring is carried out, less by the Bank's intelligent design, as in accordance with the logics of capital and territory articulated by the world's foremost institution for international capitalist development.

Clearly, any restructuring within a poor, densely-populated, and primarily agricultural territory will necessarily address agrarian questions, though, not necessarily with the goal of re-distribution of assets, poverty alleviation, or even the intensification of smallholder agricultural production. A reading of the specific bundle of projects—successes and failures—helps to determine (beyond the Bank's development rhetoric, and behind the CAS's framework), the meaning of World Bank land reform programs.

ROADS TO GOLD PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: THE WORLD BANK'S HIGHLAND SUITE

A review of the Bank's \$1.8 billion history in Guatemala reveals a gradual upward trend in disbursements, thanks to a lending spike after the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996. In 1997 the Bank introduced a \$13 million project designed to prepare conditions for the privatization of the state-owned telephone company, roads and ports.⁹ This was quickly followed by three projects totaling over \$133 million, all in the same year. In all, from 1997-2005, the IBRD introduced twenty-four separate projects totaling \$859 million, loaning more to Guatemala in nine years than it had in the past forty. The Bank's post-Accords suite of projects included seven project investments from the IFC totaling \$139 million, the largest of which was to the Glamis Gold corporation's *Marlin Mine*—\$45 million, in 2004.

The last decade of World Bank lending in Guatemala has been marked by a renewed emphasis on the private sector and a sustained effort to bring the “opportunities” of deregulation and privatization to the countryside.¹⁰ The Western Highlands receives special attention. Nearly one-third of the Bank's project lending (IBRD and IFC) since the Peace Accords has gone directly or indirectly to the Western Highlands:¹¹

- *The Reconstruction and Development Project*—\$33.5 million, that targeted San Marcos and Huehuetenango for village-level community development projects;
- *The Land Fund Project*—\$23 million, introduced in January of 1999;

⁹ “... to prepare selected infrastructure sectors -ports, power, telecommunications, highways, and the postal service- for concessioning and privatization..” Project Appraisal Document, Private Participation in Infrastructure Technical Assistance Loan, April 2, 1997

¹⁰ While the Bank's CAS and Project Appraisal Documents spill copious amounts of ink regarding the potential benefits to the poor in this regard, the Bank rarely measures the actual poverty impacts of their project interventions, and thus avoids having to report on whether or not they have the intended results. Bank officials attempt to blunt criticism on this point by referring to the impossibility of a “counterfactual”. In other words, since there is no development “control plot” in which all variables can be held constant, it is impossible to know if economic improvement (or deterioration) in a given country is due to Bank projects or to extraneous factors. Unless massive public protests or incontrovertible events suggest otherwise, the Bank simply assumes their completed projects to be successful.

¹¹ Even the national *Judicial Reform Project* reported its first activities within the Highlands “Work on pilot mobile justice of the peace courts is ongoing in Guatemala City and Quetzaltenango.... The Justice Center of Quetzaltenango was inaugurated in October 2004.” WB-SOPE, Pg 1182. The *Competitiveness Project* also reported assisting “the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in the mining sector...” an oblique reference to the Marlin Mine in San Marcos.

- *The Second Rural and Main Roads Project*—\$46.7 million, that specifically targeted San Marcos and Huehuetenango in the Western Highlands, followed in 2003;
- *The Western Altiplano Natural Resources Management Project*, comprised of an \$8 million GEF project and a \$32.8 million IBRD project, approved in May of 2003; and
- *The Project to Support a Rural Economic Development Program*—\$30 million, shared with the Inter-American Development Bank approved in March, 2006;
- *The Land Administration Project II*—\$50 million, an effort to apply the “lessons learned” from the first Land Administration Project in the Petén to the Western Highlands (in the pipeline as of this writing).
- *The Marlin Mine*—\$45 million to the Glamis Gold Ltd. from the International Finance Corporation to re-open the Marlin gold mine in San Marcos.

Responding to the semi-feudal conditions that sparked the 36-year Civil War in the first place, after the Peace Accords the World Bank introduced market-based land reform with the *Land Administration Project* (1998).ⁱⁱⁱ According to the Project Appraisal Document, the objectives of the (still active) project are:

- a) To increase legal security of land tenure in Guatemala; and
- b) To strengthen the legal and institutional framework for land registry and cadastre services nationwide.^{iv}

However, against the wishes of the Bank, the GoG did not implement the project in the Western Highlands:

“The Altiplano is the most densely populated area and is thought to have the most land conflicts... [it] represented a high-risk, high-payoff area. [But] because of the lack of experience in land regularization in the country, the GoG requested this option be discarded due to high demonstration effect of a first pilot, in favor of [the Petén] a lower-risk area” (World Bank 1998:8).

The nationwide *Land Fund Project* however, went forward without initial protest from the GoG. With this project the Bank attempted to help FONTIERRAS

- a) establish a program to facilitate access to land to beneficiaries;
- b) support beneficiaries to access technical assistance and productive subproject financing;
- and
- c) improve the legal and institutional framework for land markets to work more efficiently.

But all told, between 1994-2000 INTA/FONTIERRAS only benefited some 4,000 families with public financing for land acquisition and subsidies and technical assistance (Saldivar 2005). The GoG was unable to establish a functional land market and privatized primarily unused public lands. Eventually, the government simply cancelled the project, unwilling to continue acquiring debt for a project that had little support amongst politicians (Garoz 2005).

ENVIRONMENTAL ENCLOSURES

In 2003, the World Bank attempted to introduce a mammoth fifty million dollar environmental project in the Western Highlands. The *Western Altiplano Natural Resources Management Project* (MIRNA) was a northern environmentalist's dream. According to the Bank, MIRNA would both conserve the environment and combat poverty in the Highlands by

- (a) increasing social capital around natural resources management, through support to communities, organizations and local authorities (traditional and municipal) to jointly define and implement a local development vision which takes natural resources management and sustainability objectives into account;
- (b) increasing opportunities to sustainably improve productivity and diversify farming and other (off-farm) livelihood systems;
- (c) extending and strengthening ongoing efforts of indigenous communities to establish permanent conservation areas within broader zones of biodiversity of global importance and to maintain the habitats which sustain this diversity; and
- (d) establishing and piloting a framework for environmental services markets to sustain local incentives for conservation.¹²

The Bank saw MIRNA as a “Mayan peoples development project” designed to ensure sustainable livelihoods and conserve biodiversity. Of course, establishing biodiversity reserves in highly populated or intensively managed forests necessarily exempted these resources from the livelihood

¹² Project Abstract May 7, 2003, <http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P064883>

strategies of surrounding indigenous villages. The project proposed measures to mitigate a “run” on available resources by focusing on forest, soil and water conservation in private plots, and by intensifying both agricultural and off-farm production. Many aspects of the proposal sought to solidify communal indigenous control over natural resources by involving traditional indigenous in land and resource regulation, and in decisions regarding conservation.

Setting aside the political and economic viability of a proposal that did not specifically address the causes of poverty in the Highlands (and pointedly avoided any mention of *gold*, the region’s most marketable natural resource) because nearly 15% of Highland forests and pastures are communally managed (World Bank 2003)^v, MIRNA also amounted to an *environmental enclosure* of indigenous lands. Consistent with the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy, the project assumed that creating markets for conservation was the key to sustainable livelihoods in the Western Highlands. This required privatizing environmental services, above-ground resources, and land. In order to create the biodiversity reserves and ensure rents of the Highland’s stream of environmental services, property rights had to be secured and land (communal and private) had to be titled, making land regularization a priority. In this way, MIRNA attempted to accomplish through environmental planning what the Land Administration Project had not been able to do through land markets: title and privatize land in the Western Highlands.

But because of its potential for re-distribution, the dismantling of “public lands” through private titling dismantles existing social relations, as does the “creation” of public lands for environmental services. This led to resistance on the part of Guatemala’s landed elites. Unsurprisingly, MIRNA was rejected by the Guatemalan Congress in 2004. Lamenting what the Bank determined was bad timing, the Project Completion Note (World Bank 2005:5) states,

“The principal factors that led to the cancellation of the *Western Altiplano Natural Resources Management Project* were:

- (i) government's failure to gain consensus and obtain the legislative approvals required for project effectiveness prior to the national elections and change of administration; and
- (ii) the very difficult fiscal situation the new government inherited, requiring austerity measures that forced the sectoral ministries to reassess their priorities.”

Essentially, the World Bank ran up against the refusal of Guatemalan elites to pay taxes, the disinterest of the rural bourgeoisie in land reform, and the inability of the ruling classes to see any advantage in giving indigenous communities any substantive (if limited) control over natural resources in the Highlands. The take-home lessons of FONTIERRAS and MIRNA are; the interests of national capitals are not always consonant with those of international capitals. In 2005 the Bank noted:

“[The] CAS program had... difficulty achieving its goals. This arose, in part, from the lack of governmental commitment during 2000-03 to aspects of the reform agenda laid out in 1998. It was also due to disagreements in Guatemalan society about how to go forward. For example, the *Fontierras* project was affected by the incongruence of the model adopted by the Government; the rural financing and natural resources components of the CAS program virtually evaporated.” (World Bank 2005:37)

“DRILLING DOWN” FOR TERRITORIAL RESTRUCTURING

Undeterred by its inability to obtain agreement from the Guatemalan political class on the environmental terms of production and extraction in the Western Highlands, the Bank turned towards international trade, introducing the *First Broad-Based Growth Development Policy Loan*—\$100 million in June, 2005. The loan focuses on promoting DR-CAFTA oriented trade and investment. The Bank recognized that the project would not be easily implemented. Among the risks were the Guatemalan Congress’ “political gridlock”, and “societal tensions” related to the country’s post-conflict status, especially around controversial areas like continued trade liberalization, promotion of increased private participation in infrastructure, and issues surrounding property rights and land. To deal with the “slower-than-hoped-for” results in economic growth in Guatemala, among other things, the Bank suggested strengthening the climate for both domestic and foreign investment, modernizing property rights, and addressing infrastructure bottlenecks to growth (World Bank 2005:8).

Unsurprisingly, the Bank saw as “Fundamental to Guatemala’s growth agenda—as well as to the achievement of increased social solidarity and a better business climate—is the question of *secure rights to land*.” (*Ibid*: 11)

But secure rights to land are primarily important in areas with potential for private

extraction to global and DC-CAFTA markets. As a territorial companion to the nationally-focused loan, in March, 2006, the Bank also introduced the *Project to Support a Rural Economic Development Program* (\$60 million), shared with the Inter-American Development Bank.

The project focuses on rural infrastructure, broadband internet capacities, territorial management plans and strategic investments in the Western Highlands.¹³ It specifically introduces the *Territorial Management Model*—TMM. The TMM is expected to ‘influence national and sector policies as well as public investment priorities...’ through an integrated and decentralized territorial strategic information system...’ and is, “[Expected] to have a positive impact on increasing the competitiveness of rural based productive activities which in turn will impact enterprise expansion and export growth—and thus help to exploit the potential benefits to Guatemala of the newly ratified Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)” (World Bank 2006:4).

The World Bank’s Project Appraisal Document for the project reads a bit like a military operation with “territorial objectives”, roads, and the production of “strategic information” within the DR-CAFTA structural campaign. The Bank had no problem getting the GoG’s approval for a loan in which market opportunities did not imply a re-distribution of assets. It is not hard to imagine which sectors within Guatemalan society are best positioned to take advantage of the project’s plan for the capitalization of the Highlands.

GOLD STRIKE IN THE HYPERSPACE

Meanwhile, behind the IBRD’s (de)regulatory, social, and environmental agendas, hidden from the view of development practitioners and agrarian reform advocates, the one thing that the Bank and the Berger government could agree on wholeheartedly was opening the Highlands to mining. According to Solano (2005), by 2005 the GoG gave away over 115 new licenses to foreign mining companies, bringing the total to over 200 potential operations, nine-tenths of which were in the Highland’s indigenous territories (see map^{vi}).

In June of 2004, the International Finance Corporation extended a \$45 million non-equity loan to the Canadian-owned Glamis Gold Ltd.—Canada’s fourth largest gold producer—to begin operations in the Department of San Marcos on the *Marlin Mine*. The project incurred no debt for the government, and the IFC gave Glamis and the GoG assurances that with the Bank’s financing and project advice,

¹³ San Marcos; Huehuetenango; Solalá; Quetzaltenango; Totonicapán; Chimaltenango; Sacatepequez; and Alta Verapaz

Marlin would avoid the social conflict and environmental degradation often associated with mining. The IFC and the Berger family were particularly interested in opening up Guatemala's mining industry to new investment.¹⁴

The Bank was publicly upbeat on the virtues of its “Environmentally and Socially Responsible Mining Sector”:

“The sector presents a strong potential to benefit Guatemala if the development is supported and implemented properly. In this context, IFC has been assisting the project on various fronts including the environmental and social aspects and surrounding communities (sic) development. For instance, IFC's Corporate Citizenship Facility funded a technical assistance initiative to provide training to the indigenous communities around the mine in developing and managing forest nurseries for reforestation, as well as helping to identify other markets which these nurseries can supply.” (World Bank 2005:38).

The Bank recognized that re-activation of mining in the Western Highlands was not a simple matter. It also saw a clear link between agrarian problems and mining development:

“[Mining] development has also been a very polarizing theme and has given rise to large demonstrations by indigenous groups and local and foreign NGOs against mining in particular and the Government in general. Mining, in some sense, has become a flashpoint for long-held grievances against the state and the private sector with respect to past human rights abuses, discrimination and economic exploitation. This is also apparent in a series of conflicts over land between peasant and land-owner groups, which have, in a few cases, turned violent (World Bank 2005:57).

Zealously embracing the World Bank's suggestion that the country “modernize” its mining sector through foreign investment, the GoG had earlier reduced requirements for royalties from 6% to 1%, and taxes on profits from 58% to 31%. Just for Glamis Gold, the Berger government offered a special four-year tax holiday timed to coincide with the mine's peak production period (Solano 2005).¹⁵

¹⁴ See Solano (2005) on the Berger family's links to mining interests in Guatemala.

¹⁵ Bending to international pressure, in July of 2006 Glamis Gold announced it would waive the tax holiday and begin paying taxes on its super-profits immediately.

A mighty flagship for the mining sector in Guatemala, the *Marlin* mine quickly became Glamis' most lucrative operation. The mine is expected to produce 2.1—2.5 million ounces of gold and 29.2 million ounces of silver over an 11-year period.¹⁶ In response to international controversy regarding the mine, the IFC insists that “[This] project... can be operated in a responsible way to help reduce poverty in the region and improve peoples’ lives. We would ask everyone concerned with the plight of the Guatemalan people in this impoverished region to consider objectively the facts and the reality of the situation.”¹⁷

I once sat in a meeting with the IFC and several village representatives from San Marcos who had come to Washington, D.C. to demand the Bank withdraw its support of the Marlin Mine. The IFC’s senior manager of the mining investment division challenged the villagers straight away, “Do you want a mine, or do you want to remain poor for the rest of your lives?”

His remarkable question not only revealed the very limited way the IFC envisages its development mission,¹⁸ it also inadvertently unveiled the convenient territorial fiction used by the World Bank when it invokes local development to justify the massive extraction of wealth from poor countries... Calculating from the company’s own projections, over the next 11 years, Glamis Gold will likely walk away with over US\$1 billion in net profits, *from just one mine*. The Guatemalan Government is allowed to keep some \$273 million, of which \$6.6 million will be invested in the nearby communities at the mine’s site.^{vii} The World Bank has thus far invested some \$228.2 million in public funds for the territorial restructuring of the Western Highlands. If just *half* the profits from the Marlin Mine were applied to development programs over that same geographic area, it would still amount to over twice as much as the World Bank’s public investment. When one considers that the World Bank’s investments are actually market-rate loans to the GoG, the ugly irony of the Bank’s development calculus is that the citizens of Guatemala are paying the World Bank for the privilege of making foreign companies like Glamis Gold very rich.^{viii}

These bold levels of wealth extraction are impossible without complicit national elites and the structurally enabling conditions provided by the World Bank. When the extraction pattern of the

¹⁶ “Total gold resources, including the reserves in the mine plan, are 5.6 million ounces. [Glamis] has recently discovered another high grade deposit in the area surrounding Marlin” (IFC, 2004:8)

¹⁷ <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/0..contentMDK:20421886~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:336930,00.html>

¹⁸ “Our mission is to promote sustainable private sector investment in developing countries, helping to reduce poverty and improve people’s lives.” <http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/about.nsf/Content/Mission>

Glamis mine-shed is extrapolated to the territorial scale of the 200+ mining concessions in the Western Highlands, the function of World Bank's development hyperspace becomes clear: the plunder of the remaining resources on indigenous lands in Guatemala.^{ix}

CONCLUSION: AGRARIAN REFORM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR TERRITORY

The future of the indigenous peoples—and the peasantry—of Guatemala, is inextricably tied to Western Highlands. The titling of land and the development of land markets is but one part of a suite of projects advanced by the World Bank for regressive territorial restructuring that favors foreign investment and extractive industries over indigenous rural livelihoods.

Current demands for re-distributive land reform rightly focus on the importance of land as a factor of production, a social resource, and a cultural necessity for indigenous peasant communities. This approach recognizes that land tenure has always been part of larger agrarian questions that addresses the distribution of assets *and* control over the production and accumulation/distribution of wealth.

Therefore, the debate regarding the importance of the re-distribution of land as a production factor cannot ignore the threats facing the condition of land as an asset. The lack of sufficient farm and forest land is indeed a serious problem for indigenous peasant livelihoods. But the colonization of *existing* indigenous land by extractive industries threatens the livelihoods of both landed and landless peasants alike. In this sense, in Guatemala, mining must be viewed as a *broad-based agrarian threat*, not only to peasant livelihoods, but to indigenous existence in the Highlands. This threat arises not simply from the mine-shed—the footprint of social and environmental externalities associated with the physical act of mining—it is inherent in the political and economic transformation of rural territory associated with the restructured development hyperspace created by the World Bank... the very hyperspace that enable activities like predatory gold mining to take root in the first place.

Despite its humanistic development discourse, the World Bank treats the relation between land and resources, not from the point of view of indigenous livelihoods, but from the logic of capital and the logic of territory. By denouncing the Bank's market-based land reform, peasant movements correctly recognize the logic of capital embedded in the Bank's projects. However, by focusing only on land reform and agriculture, these arguments miss the logic of territory by which the Bank *grounds* its projects for capital. This allows the World Bank to aggressively restructure territory on one hand, even while it weakly advances projects for land reform, environmental management, or agricultural development on the other. The political reality of territorial restructuring suggests the need for

grounding both livelihood struggles and re-distributive agrarian reform movements within strategies for *territorial resistance*. This implies not only resisting the ways in which capital, through the World Bank, redraws, reshapes, and re-situates indigenous communities and livelihoods in the function of its own logic s, it requires that indigenous communities implement their own direct actions and advance their own proposals for territorial restructuring from below , in effect, for “*redistributive territorial reform*.”

Livelihood struggles that implement peasant-led sustainable agriculture strategies will be of little use if land, water, and farmers are lost to mining interests. Agrarian reform struggles may succeed in rallying landless peasants against market-led land reform, but without the participation of smallholders and indigenous communities, this will not likely tip the balance in favor of re-distributive reforms. Grounding agrarian reform within territorial resistance allows both landless and landed peasants to converge on common platforms for livelihood and survival. It also provides an opportunity to link concrete struggles for land and livelihoods to abstract struggles—such as the resistance to DR-CAFTA.^x As in many areas of Latin America, grounding land struggles within territorial struggles also links land, livelihood, and political-economic restructuring to place. For most indigenous peoples, place is as basic as language. Since the defense of place is quintessentially an issue of territory, place is never far from the surface of indigenous-peasant demands for land. Conversely, then, demands for land should never be far from defense of place.

Over the next decade, agrarian struggles for land in Guatemala’s Western Highlands may well be eclipsed by indigenous movements against mineral extraction. Both are essentially struggles for livelihoods and cultural survival. Indigenous resistance to territorial restructuring is not only crucial for confronting capital’s threats to indigenous survival, it is necessary for embarking on purposive action for the “restructuring from below” that reaffirms indigenous space and place in the face territorial restructuring “from above.”

Just as an understanding of territorial restructuring informs territorial resistance, acts of territorial resistance open spaces and places for territorial sovereignty, the basis for indigenous survival and the improvement of peasant livelihoods.

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ⁱ In this analysis, the "structural context" refers to the political economic conditions (institutions, laws, policies, endowments) that determine the 'nature, pace, extent, and direction of surplus production and extraction from the land and the disposition of such surplus.

ⁱⁱ Given the World Bank's mission, one might expect the Bank to help weak governments negotiate strong, redistributive contracts that contribute to the reconstruction of the state and poverty

alleviation. The fact that this is rarely the case is due to the fact that the Bank's mission is secondary to the World Bank's job, historically:

In the wake of two world wars (and in the face of the meteoric industrialization of the Soviet Union) Western powers created two multilateral, global finance institutions to rebuild Europe and to manage the cyclical crises of capital for the consolidation of capitalist nation-states. The IMF was charged with maintaining stable currencies, the World Bank with creating favorable conditions for investment through reconstruction of infrastructure in Western Europe. (Both consolidated the power of the United States and the US dollar.)

The World Bank in particular became a negotiating forum for the leading capitalist powers. Members nations of the World Bank enjoy voting rights commensurate with the shares of actual and "callable capital". Each country Director on the Board is appointed by the finance or treasury ministers of their country.

While the "mission" of the WB is the alleviation of poverty, its "job" is to manage the tensions, crises and contradictions of capital between western powers by providing a negotiating forum for the G-8. Directors at the World Bank negotiate projects and policies that will facilitate their respective investment and contract opportunities in the developing world. This also entails mitigating the social and environmental externalities resulting from these investments in order to continually insure stable conditions for capital investment and accumulation.

Development--the WB's mission-- has evolved over time. The original mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was the reconstruction of Western Europe. This was superseded by the Marshall Plan, forcing the Bank to turn its eyes on the Third World. After several development decades resulted in the intractable Third World Debt, the SAPs, and the hollowing of the state, the WB began to assume more and more functions for social, political, and economic mitigation in failed Development states.

One of the Bank's current chores is to create favorable conditions to off-load what bankers now openly refer to as "excess liquidity." The contradictions of capital produces winners and losers, of course, and the G-8 countries (the Bank's de-facto owners) use the Bank to ensure that the substantial risks and costs of expanding investments are borne by the borrowers and the tax-paying public—not by lenders.

The Bank's renewed emphasis on the private sector, infrastructure, and extractive industries reflects a strategy of accumulation by dispossession designed to open new areas to private investment, particularly in high-risk, high-return investments (such as infrastructure), and in quick-return investments (such as extractive industries). Further, the Bank's new global frameworks for "regional integration" in which new and old points of production and energy generation are re-woven into extensive networks of roads, waterways and ocean ports, reflect the "logic of capital" and "logic of territory" laid out by Harvey (2003) to explain imperialism's strategies for resolving the cyclical crises of production, and consumption.

The Bank's strategy comes on the heels of the hollowing of the nation-state and the dismantling of the Keynesian Consensus begun with the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s. The Washington/post-Washington consensus of the 1990s to the present succeeded not only in dispossessing developing nations of their public industries and services, it stripped the state of its regulatory capacity, thus opening the way for the wholesale takeover of natural resources by private (and predatory) international capital. After the first run on state-owned industries and services, international capital turned to the primary sector and extractive industries for further outlets to capital.

ⁱⁱⁱ According to the Ministry of Agriculture, in Guatemala,

- 0.15% producers occupy 70% arable land

- 96% producers occupy 20% arable land
- 90% rural population lives below poverty line
- 500,000 families live below subsistence levels


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Of 10.6 million hectares in Guatemala, only 2.8 million are cultivated and over 2.4 million are sub-utilized. Some 5.4 million hectares (over half Guatemala) need to be distributed for landless and smallholders to have at least 7 hectares each for subsistence. Nonetheless, agrarian reform has been successfully blocked by Guatemalan rural elites ever since President Jacobo Arbenz' 1954 Land Reform was undone by a CIA-backed military coup. Thirty years later, in the face of a growing indigenous and peasant insurgency, USAID bought up 28 farms for a land bank, distributing 1,400 over a period of six years Saldívar, L., and Wittman, Hanna (2005). Acuerdo de paz y fondo de tierras en Guatemala. El Banco Mundial y la Tierra: ofensiva y resistencia en América Latina, África y Asia. M. Días Martins. San José, Costa Rica, Editorial Departamento Ecueménico de Investigaciones (DEI): 163-185..

According to the World Bank, early efforts at market-led land reform by INTA/FONTIERRAS (1994-1996) were relatively unsuccessful, due to reluctance on the part of large landowners, land speculation, lack of saving on the part of the peasantry, and ambiguity of property rights.

^{iv} “The project consists of three components. First, cadastre and land regularization will support the mapping of the Petén cadastre, in-field adjudication upon demand, and data processing of areas subject to regularization. The end result is the establishment of a parcel-based cadastre that can be integrated with the registry system. Second, the land registry component will support the opening of a registry office in Petén and modernizing registry records management.” World Bank Project Abstract, <http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64312881&piPK=64302848&theSitePK=40941&Projectid=P049616>

^v EIA MIRNA: Los datos del INAB indican que para el Altiplano Occidental existen al menos 1047.2 km² de bosques comunales o municipales, mismos que representan un 50.9% del total nacional de bosques comunales. Al mismo tiempo, estos bosques, cuyo número supera los 90 bosques⁴, representan un 14.6% del total de cobertura forestal reportada por el INAB (1999) para el Altiplano Occidental. La distribución porcentual por departamento del Altiplano Occidental es la siguiente: Totonicapán 7.3%; Sololá 9.6%; Quiché 29.9%; Chimaltenango 3.0%; Huehuetenango 32.2%; Quetzaltenango 17.0% y San Marcos 1.0%. Leiva (2,000) analizó algunas características silviculturales de 115 bosques del Altiplano Occidental y encontró que 56 de ellos tienen extensiones que superan las 100 ha. Elías (1995) realizó un inventario de más de 95 bosques comunales y municipales y encontró que al menos 17 de ellos superan las 500 ha. 11



vi

vii Glamis claims it has already invested 1.3 million in social works in San Miguel Ixtahuacán, the community closest to the actual mine site. It has also promised to pay the municipalities of San Miguel Ixtahuacán and Sipacapa some \$350,000 annually in royalties. These funds will be earmarked for municipal development. Meanwhile, Glamis and the IFC contracted the Washington-based Citizen's Development Corps (CDC), to establish the Fundación Sierra Madre (FSM) to carry out community development projects. The residents of Sipacapa already have a municipal integrated development plan developed by their own communities, which was never considered. Further, they have been denied access to FSM's development plan and financial information. They are concerned that they will see little actual or sustainable development through an institution that is basically controlled by the mining company. The IFC claims, "The responsible extraction of mineral resources is one of the few ways that local indigenous people can hope to break the cycle of poverty." In meetings in Washington D.C. with village representatives, the IFC presented villagers with an "either/or" scenario: either they accept the mine, or they will continue to live in poverty. Representative from Sipacapa responded, "There are many paths to development. In any enterprise there are winners and losers, costs and benefits. We need to know the whole story to make good decisions." Neither the IFC nor Glamis Gold have ever presented the villagers with an accounting of the social, economic or environmental costs of the mine.

http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/latin_america/2019.php

To illustrate the differences in distribution of benefits from World Bank lending, it is revealing that Glamis' top five CEOs stand to make over \$19 million just in salaries during this period (not counting their stock options—now at \$1.4 million—bonuses or raises). That is three times the amount the local communities will make from the Marlin Mine during that same time period.

^{viii} Since this writing, Glamis Gold, a medium sized-company, sold out to Goldcorp, a Canadian mining giant that boasts the third largest mining portfolio in North America. According to their own website www.goldcorp.com Goldcorp is, "... one of the world's largest gold mining companies with the strongest production growth profile among all major gold companies. Goldcorp's operations are focused throughout the Americas and Australia with 70% of its reserves in NAFTA countries. Earnings for the 9 months ended September 30, 2006 were US\$342 million with operating cash flows of \$536 million. With the recent acquisition of Glamis, Goldcorp will immediately double its reserves and resources and increase production by 50% over the next 4 years." Thus, public monies lent through the World Bank have served to further concentrate capital in northern mining interests.

^{ix} It does not take a World Bank ecologist to know that the Western Highlands are in serious trouble. One glance from a hilltop in San Marcos is enough to appreciate that the levels of deforestation, soil erosion, population density, and underemployment have reached critical threshold levels. Another big hurricane or earthquake—or a national currency crisis—could easily push the region into socio-economic and environmental collapse.

A serious approach to development would have carried out extensive diagnostic studies and strategic environmental assessments (SEAs) in the Highlands to determine the levels of socio-economic and environmental threats, opportunities, limitations, capabilities, and available resources (*including* minerals); and would engage in a deep and broad participatory analysis to identify problems, causes, and potential solutions. Then, municipal and territorial development plans would be formulated, indicating how local resources of land, labor and capital might be organized to eliminate poverty and promote sustainable development. There is no great science to this. The methods and toolkits for this work are numerous and well-tried, even at the World Bank. On the basis of this kind of analysis and planning, communities, regions and the national government would debate and determine what kind of land reform was appropriate, its level of re-distribution, and would plan and execute reform within the context of broader agrarian reforms and territorial re-structuring from below. It is not unreasonable to think that mining might play a role in generating the wealth needed to finance this kind of re-distributive restructuring. The Marlin Mine is evidence of the fact that there is more than enough mineral wealth in the Western Highlands to finance the region's long-term, sustainable development—if it was equitably distributed. This would require actual development work and a development institution capable of creating the structural conditions for implementation. Unfortunately, the World Bank, the one institution with the human and financial resources needed for this extensive task lacks any political will to carry out this kind of re-distributive re-structuring...

^x "Most campesinos don't fight for water rights, land rights, or for abstract notions of sustainability, justice, or 'participation' in development... they struggle for food, for water, for land, for forests, for a fair price for their products. They struggle for good healthcare, for decent dwellings, and for education for their children. In short, they fight for their livelihoods, not for causes." Holt-Giménez, E. (2006). *Campesino a Campesino: Voices from Latin America's Farmer to Farmer Movement*. Oakland, California, Food First. pg. 182.