Agrarian Reform and Counter-Reform in Chile

Joseph Collins
Agrarian Reform and Counter-Reform in Chile
also by Joseph Collins

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Introduction

Five years have passed since a military junta violently overthrew the constitutional government of President Salvador Allende. In these five years of martial law, the junta has summarily detained, tortured, murdered, and forced into exile untold tens of thousands of Chileans. Such human rights crimes of the junta are protested the world over — thanks, in part, to their documentation by such organizations as the Chilean Catholic Church and Amnesty International. On my own visit to Chile, I sought to measure the junta's human rights impact in yet another way by asking:

• What have been the policies of the junta in the countryside?
• What have been their consequences for the well-being of the Chilean people?
The Pinochet junta’s abolition of farming cooperatives has created a large pool of landless day laborers who work from “sun to sun” on meager wages. Photo: Joseph Collins

Agrarian Reform Before the Junta

In 1965, a mere 730 estates controlled half of Chile’s agricultural land—over 25 million acres. By contrast, 45,233 farms were of less than 2.5 acres and 156,769 were of less than 25 acres. In the prime central zone, only 8 percent of the farm units controlled over 80 percent of the land. Almost half of the rural population were deprived of land ownership; they survived as permanent laborers on the large estates (latifundia), paid mainly in kind and with the right to use some of the land. Despite an exceptionally favorable ratio of people to good agricultural land (the countryside resembles the Pacific coastal states of the United States), Chile imported more agricultural products than it exported, with the deficit growing during the 1960’s.

By 1965, the urgency of land reform could no longer be denied. Agricultural stagnation combined with pressure from campesinos beginning to organize unions (and, in a few cases, to seize land) and some recognition of the gross injustices in the countryside motivated the land reform of the Christian Democrat government (1965-70). While land was promised to 100,000 campesino families, only 20,000 in fact received land.

It was not until the Popular Unity government (1970-1973) that agrarian reform accelerated, under great pressure from organized campesino groups. Cooperative structures (asentamientos) were organized not only to rationalize the use of the land and modern equipment and other inputs but also to create structures of
effective participation for the rural majority traditionally disenfranchised from national political power.

By the time of the military coup in 1973, there were no longer any estates with over 200 prime acres. Over 40 percent of the cultivable land was in the reform sector. The campesinos were massively organized.

The Junta's Counter-Agrarian Reform

With a penchant for doublespeak, the military junta immediately set out to "normalize" and "consolidate" agrarian reform. The junta has sought to reinstate and reinforce private property at every turn.

Thirty percent of the land expropriated under the agrarian reform law was given to the former estate patrones. In 1,512 cases, the entire estate was returned. In other cases, former estate owners could apply for the equivalent of 200 irrigated acres, invariably the best land of the asentamientos, in exchange for the cancellation of the government's debt of compensation for the earlier expropriation. Another 30 percent of the 20 million acres worked in 1973 as cooperative farms were auctioned to private buyers. The remaining 33 percent of the land was parceled into plots to be paid for over a number of years. Seven percent of the land is held by the state.

The junta brags that, unlike the Christian Democrat and Popular Unity governments, it has assigned land titles to individual peasants. Technically, the members of the asentamientos of the Allende years had not received individual land titles. "They have sought to erase the image that it's possible to work in common," one 47-year-old former campesino leader told me. Moreover, by handing land back to former estate patrones and by individually titling land, the junta sought to divide the campesinos. At least one-third of the asentamiento members have been excluded from getting land. The junta sought to co-opt the other two-thirds by making them think that they, too, are now landowners.

By what process did the junta decide who would receive the parcels of land? First, a military-appointed commission decreed how many parcels "capable of supporting a man and his family" could be carved from what was left of the asentamiento after restitution to the former patrones. The number of parcels to be assigned was invariably fewer than the number of cooperative members. Then it was announced that those wanting a parcel should apply to the authorities and compete by a point system.

The system awarded points according to years of schooling, number of children (single people were disqualified), aptitude for...
agricultural work, and entrepreneurial capabilities. The system pretended to exalt "technical criteria" over "political criteria." Yet any prior involvement in the management of an asentamiento merited negative points. Decree 208 disqualified from ever owning land all those who have ever participated in strikes, land seizures, and other conflicts with patrones.

Decree 208 unleashed the most hateful ratting and other forms of revenge and division in the history of the Chilean countryside. People perceived themselves in a life or death predicament. Conversations I had with campesinos and transcripts of dozens of hours of interviews I read with campesino leaders invariably mentioned this bitter experience.

Many pointed to the special role the patrones played in the whole outrageous system. The patrones collaborated with the intelligence services to list those to be excluded by Decree 208. Included in the competition for parcels were non-asentamiento members—truck owners, local shop and other business owners, former administrators of the estate, and relatives of former patrones. The patron had the sole responsibility (independent even of any commission) to grade non-members of an asentamiento who had once been his employees. Many have charged that the patrones worked to get approved only "their men" who reportedly later leased their parcels back to the patron.

The entire process of candidate grading was secret, but the general fear in the countryside (particularly because of Decree 208) prevented anyone from speaking out. Appeal to the commission was theoretically possible but, as one campesino with 40 years work on the fundo and now deprived of land told me, "No one would be so foolish.”

They have sought to erase the image that it's possible to work in common.

Previous governments' credits had made it possible for the asentamientos to obtain a good deal of agricultural machinery. The junta, saying that it wanted to free agriculture from state control, ordered all the machinery to be publicly auctioned. Naturally, those able to buy, even at the bargain prices, were not the asentamiento members, but large entrepreneurial farmers, local businessmen, and even some city-based speculators. Commenting on seeing some
asentamiento members watching their tractors and implements auctioned off, a country priest told me, "It's as if the military wanted the campesinos' last experience of the asentamiento to be the saddest of all."

Near Talca I visited a number of ex-asentamientos. One, not atypically, had supported 23 members and their families during the Popular Unity years. "Normalization" and "consolidation" on this asentamiento meant giving part of the land back to the former estate owner (who lived in Santiago) and dividing the rest into 11 parcels. Six of these parcels went to non-members of the asentamientos—a gasoline station owner, a baker (who wanted a small dairy farm for providing cream), and the former administrator of the pre-reform estate plus three of his relatives.

I learned the history of a nearby former estate. Under the ownership of a Chilean living in Switzerland, it had 38 resident families as employees (inquilinos). With the Popular Unity government, the workers had organized to demand reform as was especially common in the case of absentee ownership. In 1970 the asentamiento was created with 62 members and soon became known for its productivity. But with the counter reform, a large prime part of the estate was taken from the workers and returned to the Chilean in Switzerland. She, in turn, without ever returning to Chile, sold to a group of Santiago investors who put the land into pasture and are raising cattle. The remaining land was divided into six parcels. Eight of the 38 asentamiento members were disqualified by Decree 208. Of the 30 remaining, only four received parcels, the other two going to the former administrator of the fundo and his son.

Another former estate which had been turned into five asentamientos was cut up into 90 parcels for which 161 people applied. One-third of these parcels were given to people who had not been part of the former asentamientos. In the Rancagua area, a group of 5 asentamientos was turned into 44 parcels, 14 of which went to non-asentamiento members. In the same zone, on another asentamiento, 17 persons were disqualified by Decree 208 while 13 outsiders, including 2 butchers, received parcels.

"The Sacrosanct Laws of the Market"

Central to the junta's stated ideology is the article of faith: open competition without any state intervention will achieve the maximum of efficiency. The so-called "laws of the market," the junta decrees, should rule. In no other country in the world is schoolbook capitalism being so fully experienced. And for that, much credit should go to the University of Chicago's Milton Friedman and his
Chilean students who now figure prominently among the junta's leading economic advisors.

In agricultural production and commerce there is a dramatic withdrawal of the state. Compared to 1973, there are now fewer than half of the public employees in agriculture. And in real terms

_In October 1977, the price of bread was "liberated." Over the next 11 months the price rose 83 percent._

the agriculture budget has been reduced to one-fourth. Moreover the state has handed over to private enterprise such functions as technical assistance to farmers and has sold to private corporations the great majority of public enterprises that marketed and processed agricultural products.

There is one big exception to this withdrawal. The state does support agricultural exports. Exceptional low-interest credits for export producers and agricultural export investments (9 percent compared to roughly 30-60 percent on the open market) is one principal way.

In late 1977 the junta, following the free trade norms of the Milton Friedman school, sought to throw local producers into open international competition by virtually eliminating significant tariffs on agricultural imports. Likewise, domestic price supports were virtually eliminated. Beginning in 1978, the government ceased to make purchases on the agricultural market as a mechanism to support prices. (There is still a very limited exception in the case of milk, due to the sustained protests of dairy farmers that milk products were being dumped on the international market through heavy subsidies from the governments of the principal dairy-exporting countries. The government reluctantly set the price for milk at $300 per ton.)

Finally, the junta has removed virtually all price controls on consumer food prices. Free competition, says the junta, would keep food prices under control. In October, 1977, the price of bread was "liberated." Over the next 11 months the price rose 83 percent in contrast to the official (conservative) overall inflation rate of 36 percent.
Illusory Rewards of Ownership

There are the approximately 49,000 parcels in the junta's "reform" sector. While there are a few parceleros lucky enough to have acquired an already established vineyard or orchard producing for export, the great majority of the campesino recipients are having tremendous difficulties holding on to the land. They have little or no equipment or other forms of capital. They are understandably afraid to borrow money with real interest rates officially estimated at almost 60 percent and without much technical and entrepreneurial training, and with no government assistance. And, as one rural anthropologist told me, "Parceleros are beginning to learn the problems of working alone—how long it takes to get into town for one can of pesticide."

An unemployed and obviously underfed 64 year old campesino union leader summed up the situation this way: "Look, most campesinos didn't go through the process of applying for land just to sell it, let alone to the patron. But a peasant feels helpless in the face of the tremendous problem it means for him to exploit his parcel, to have to deal with banks and with the comerciantes. He doesn't know how to manage; he doesn't have an entrepreneur's abilities to confront the new responsibility. Credit is so costly and, in short, everything gets to become a problem. Thus, it appears best to sell."

Many expressed the opinion that the sale of land amounts to yet another, however disguised, restitution of land to the patrones. A national Christian Democrat campesino union leader questioned what sense there is to all the junta's rhetoric about giving actual land titles to campesinos if only a couple of years later their plight forces them to lease for 99 years, becoming at best hired hands or sharecroppers on their own land. Many parceleros in fact have sold their land, usually to nearby patrones. Since often a campesino has to reach the extremes of desperation before parting with his land, it is only now, many observers noted, that sales (often in the disguise of 50 or 99 year leases) are mounting. The owner of one estate I visited has already acquired the rights to 7 of the 8 parcels adjacent to the land returned to him.

Those parceleros still holding on are concentrating on traditional subsistence crops (like potatoes) that require the least capital. They are forced to use backward technology, for instance, poor quality, unimproved seeds. Add to this the decline in real prices precisely for these traditional crops. Lower prices reflect both that more campesinos are growing these basic goods and that demand is falling due to the marked impoverishment of the country's general working population.

Moreover, many parcels have a labor surplus problem. That is, those with some land are allowing those who were displaced and
deprived of land by the counter-agrarian reform to work — even when their labor is not really necessary. Relatives of many "parceleros" work for them in exchange for a little food and clothing. Because they are not legally employed, they are ineligible for any accident, health, or old-age benefits.

The Real Beneficiaries

In sharp contrast to these "parceleros" are the capitalist entrepreneur farmers in the rich central zone. The junta's agrarian policies have not promoted a return to the giant haciendas but to modernized farms, generally ranging in size from 100 to 500 irrigated acres, with substantial capital investments. In some cases, cheap auction purchases of asentamientos' machinery have helped to further capitalize these farms' operations at an exceptionally low financial cost. Some owners have put their prime land into pasture — both as a holding action and to take advantage of high meat prices. A few others with sizable amounts of capital have launched highly modernized production of a non-traditional crop such as rice. One such agronomist manager I met calculated a net profit of $325 per acre with excellent yields of 2.5 tons per acre.

Overwhelmingly, these farms in the central valley specialize in production for export. This is logical, given the depressed local market due both to policies that impoverish so many Chileans and to the flooding of the local market with cheap, imported products such as wheat and sugar (more on this issue later). These entrepreneurial farms are, moreover, responding to a whole series of junta policies, favorable to export, that include the removal of all export restrictions, a notoriously favorable exchange rate, and credit at an annual real interest rate of only nine percent for investment in fruit trees, table grape vineyards, wine vineyards, and cattle. The junta offers this credit thanks to large loans for that purpose from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.

Many modernized farms in Chile's central valley are investing in and producing table grapes for the U.S. market. Since Chile's seasons are the opposite of those in the United States, these commercial farms are able to produce fresh grapes at a time when California and New York cannot. Additionally, there is no competition which would be the case with many vegetables which the United States now imports from Mexico.

I saw numerous farms with one- to three-year-old installations of table grape vines and I was able to visit one, 45 minutes from Santiago, extensively. There the manager, an agronomist, ran a highly modernized operation for which he received bonuses from the investor when production increased. He estimated the vineyard
investment at $3,250 an acre; the total investment on the farm at $700,000. The investor is a Santiago banker who also enjoys having a country place to visit on Sunday afternoon.

Many commented that these modernized farms reduced the number of permanently employed by relying instead on day laborers for peak periods. When I questioned why investments in labor-displacing machinery would be favored despite the pitifully low wages, I was told that perhaps it's a combination of trying to emulate the U.S. model and the basic fear of labor discontent and desire for land.

More to the south, similarly sized farms do not have climatic conditions needed for the high-profit food export items and therefore must orient their production toward the internal market. Although more than a few owners are going into cattle production, they are in general forced to compete with low priced imports such as U.S. wheat. As a result, many have planted less area, used less inputs such as fertilizer, and therefore have produced less. The net effect is a quite generalized de-capitalization and a decrease in the employment of both permanent and seasonal workers. Despite the owners' opposition to the Popular Unity government and their enthusiasm for the crushing of campesino movements and, of course, for the restitution of much of their land, these owners, some observers suggest, are increasingly discontent with the junta's policies.

Fate of the Mini-Fundistas and Landless

In addition to the "reformed" parcelas and the capitalist, modernized farms in the central valley and the south, there are the mini-fundistas. These are traditionally very small land holders who have survived on their own meager production and by selling their labor to nearby large estates during the harvest season. These mini-fundistas are ever more impoverished by the same forces hitting the parceleros described above. The mini-fundistas also face a generally diminished demand for labor on the modernized farms, both in the south and in the central zone.

Now added to the mini-fundistas searching for work are the landless—at least 30,000 campesinos and their families whose land was taken away by the junta's counter reform as well as, in some areas, unemployed urban workers. The plight of the landless is desperate. Unemployed or underemployed, they are in no situation to negotiate their pay. Moreover, with numerous decrees strangling any union activities, wages are set individually which, as two young landless laborers told me, "lets the patron impose conditions that just a few years ago would have been unacceptable."
The indigenous people of Chile are the Mapuche. There are some 800,000 Mapuches in the south of Chile. In March, 1979 the Pinochet junta decreed a counter-agrarian reform for the Mapuches: all land the Mapuche communities have come to own and administer collectively now must be individually owned. As in the rest of the Chilean countryside, this move “to encourage private enterprise” will surely open the doors to a concentration of land ownership, the increased indebtedness of the majority, a return of the old non-Mapuches, and the progressive erosion of Mapuche community life and customs. Photo: Non-Intervention in Chile (NICL)

the landless do find a job, they now work “from sun to sun.” Doubtlessly the junta’s policies, particularly and with an increasing vengeance, will work against those who are not young and strong. Seniority counts for nothing. And, as temporary workers, most are effectively excluded from sickness, accident, and old age benefits.

In short, the imposition of the doctrinaire economic model of the junta is causing large groups of the rural population to see their standards of living violently deteriorate. Yet, two rural sociologists
told me that the unprecedented misery of so many rural people is not resulting in a notable migration to urban areas. The campesinos know, I was told, there is no work in the cities; and without money, food, housing, even clothing, survival in the city is even harder than it is in the countryside.

Has Counter-Reform At Least Increased Production?

Consider the 14 traditional crops that together account for 80 percent of the cultivated area—wheats, oats, barley, rye, green beans, lentils, chickpeas, peas, potatoes, corn, rice, rape oil seed, sunflower, and sugar beets. Over four agricultural years between 1974-75 and 1977-78 there has been an alarming drop in production (with some recovery in the exceptionally perfect weather for grain crops in 1976-77). Part of the reason for the production decline is that the total area cultivated with these 14 crops decreased 125,000 acres with a notable decline in yield. The area planted with cereals (wheat, oats, barley, and rye) diminished 300,000 acres or 15 percent. The brusque insertion of Chilean agriculture into the international market place means local producers find they cannot compete against cheap grain imports from the United States, Australia, and Argentina. Similarly, the area in oilseeds and sugar beets has declined 62,500 acres, or 25 percent due to the fall in international prices.

The case of sugar beets is particularly dramatic: in August, 1977, the producers met and declared they would be forced out of business by current abysmally low international sugar prices. In fact, in 1978, 63 percent less area was planted in beets and, whereas in 1977 Chile was self-sufficient in sugar, in 1978, 250,000 tons were imported.

On the other hand, the cultivation of certain legumes for which there is an export market has expanded—175,000 acres, or 70 percent between 1974-75 and 1977-78. They are exported, for instance, for consumption in Brazil where soybeans for cattle feed have become dominant and where the Brazilian government can outbid the hungry working people of Chile.

Yields in the 14 principal annual crops have been adversely affected even more than the area planted. Taking the yields of these 14 crops in 1970 as a standard index of 100, the index in 1965 was 88; in 1971, 103; in 1973, 88; in 1974, 95; in 1975, 93; in 1976, index 76. Agronomists I interviewed are convinced declines have been accelerating. The deterioration in yields is unquestionably attributable to the previously discussed decapitalization, especially of the small holders, but also of some of the larger farms in the south. The credit costs and low prices for most products (because of cheap im-
ports and depressed local demand) mean peasant farmers must sow seed of low quality and forego fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides in a country where such inputs were once considered normal.

In 1977, fertilizer sales for all crops were only half, and possibly less, of what they were in the last year of the Popular Unity government, and considerably less than even the mid-1960s. (The use of phosphate fertilizer has fallen to 45 percent of what it was in 1973; nitrogen to 60 percent.) Many farmers still cannot afford fertilizers, even with the sharp drop in prices which began in 1976. Pesticide sales are down 30 percent for the same period. The use of improved wheat varieties fell by 80 percent between 1975 and 1977, much greater than the fall in the area planted.

The Export Boom

The production picture is dismal only when one looks at the crops basic to the diet of ordinary people. Export crops, on the other hand, are experiencing sustained increases in the amount of acreage planted as well as in yields — especially in table grapes, wine, fruits (peaches and apples) and, to a lesser extent, certain herbs like onions and garlic.

In contrast to the sector producing for the internal food market, the export sector seeks to operate with the most sophisticated labor-displacing technology. Such installations are possible not only with great amounts of capital but also largely for those favored by the central zone’s climate. These modern operators dump 30 to 50 percent of their production — that not suitable for export — on the local market. This dumping is beginning to economically ruin the poor farmers who produce some of the same products for the domestic market.

The total value of agricultural exports has expanded from $26 million in 1973 to $159 million in 1977, and a projected $198 million in 1978.

Imports for Some

In 1977, Chile imported $323 million in food products. For 1978, the estimate was $430 million. This compares to $165 million in 1970. But the impoverished rural majority sees little, if any, of that food. Such increasing food dependency does, however, bring joy to the hearts of U.S. agribusiness. The October 23, 1978 U.S. Department of Agriculture publication Foreign Agriculture Trumpets, "Chile is Best Prospect as U.S. Poultry Market," and praises Chile’s "economic recovery" and the "easing of import policies." In April 1978, the Department of Agriculture’s Commodity Credit
Corporation granted $38 million in credits to Chile to import agricultural products, primarily wheat. This little-publicized move flies in the face of a congressional cutoff of economic assistance to the junta. It manifests U.S. administration support to the junta's policy of throwing the Chilean countryside into the international market economy.

The Chilean military junta is doing what the Chicago economists prescribe, not only for Chile, but also for the United States.

In sum, the Chilean military junta is doing what the Chicago economists prescribe — not only for Chile but also for the United States: "getting the government out of farming"; throwing the doors open to the market forces to "shake out the inefficient producers"; and taking advantage of international "comparative advantages" by removing all barriers to agricultural imports and exports. In Chile we are seeing the clear results of such a prescription — an accelerating polarization in the countryside.

At one end are the many, those who produce for the internal market — in the extreme, the poor producing for the poor:

- 30,000 families newly deprived not only of land but of the right to organize to defend themselves;
- individualized smallholders — the parceleros and minifundistas—deprived of capital, credit, assistance, and mutual aid who must compete against each other for survival;
- larger landholders, with little capital and geographically removed from the high-value export possibilities, left unprotected from imports from the world's largest and often subsidized producers.

At the other end are the few who have an increasingly concentrated hold on capital, prime land in the central valley, and income. This is the world of agribusiness — the rich producing for the rich: cattle for the Chilean minority who can afford meat, table grapes for well-off Americans, and the Chilean elite reveling in a tariff-free world of chicken and other food imports from American agribusiness.

Maintaining these policies, which perpetuate these increasingly unequal worlds in Chile, requires a military dictatorship and the abolition of all political rights. This is Chile today.
Getting Involved

For More Information about Chile

Action for Women in Chile
156 Fifth Avenue Room 521
New York, NY 10010

Chile Committee for Human Rights
1901 Q Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009

Chile Legislative Center
201 Massachusetts Avenue N.E.
Room 102
Washington, D.C. 20002

Chile Democratico
777 United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017

Free Chile Center
944 Market Street Room 308
San Francisco, California 94102

National Chile Center
7 East 15th Street Suite 408
New York, NY 10003

Non-Intervention in Chile (NICH)
151 West 19th Street Room 905
New York, NY 10011

or
Box 800
Berkeley, California 94701

North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)
151 West 19th Street
New York, NY 10011

Office for Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Chile
Box 40605
San Francisco, California 94105
or
156 Fifth Avenue Room 521
New York, NY 10010

Resistance Publications
PO Box 116
Oakland, California 94604

Education

Our educational system mimics our economic system: it makes us passive recipients of information. Overwhelming us with unassimilable facts and making us compete with each other, our "educational" process saps our energy. By contrast, each can begin to take charge of our own learning with the confidence that we can dig out what we need to know. Education can then become a source of our energy and direction.

Some see education as something that is completed as the first step to action; some see education as passive while what is needed is action. For us, however, there is no division between the two. Real education is not an abstraction; it helps us to better understand the world and therefore enables us to carry out any action more effectively. True education is not passive because it does not leave us the same as we were. Education is that which changes us.

Assuming that mass media largely reflect the economic status quo, we can seek alternative sources of information that tell us of the efforts of our counterparts here and in other countries working for their own economic self-determination.

Newsletters and magazines that are connected with organizations are listed with the organizations later in this section. Other general news sources that we have found to be helpful include:

Weeklies:
In These Times, 1509 N. Milwaukee,
Chicago, IL 60622
Africa News, P.O. Box 3851, Durham,
NC 27702

Monthlies and Periodicals:
Mother Jones, 625 3rd Street, San Francisco,
CA 94107
Dollars and Sense, 324 Somerville
Avenue, Somerville, MA 02143
The Elements, Public Resource Center,
1747 Connecticut Avenue N.W.,
Washington, DC 20009
Multinational Monitor, P.O. Box 19312,
Washington, DC 20036
NACLA Report, 151 West 19th Street,
New York, NY 10011
Community Jobs, 1704 R Street N.W., Washington, DC 20009
Nutrition Action, Center for Science in the Public Interest, 1957 S Street N.W., Washington, DC 20009
Food Monitor, P.O. Box 1975, Garden City, NY 11530
Catholic Rural Life, 3801 Grand Avenue, Des Moines, IA 50312
Monthly Review, 116 West 14th Street, New York, NY 10011

The Institute has produced a guide of the literature that it has relied upon in developing its analysis. It is entitled Food First Resource Guide and is available from the Institute. The following books are a more general list that have been useful in our own education:

Underdevelopment and World Hunger
Perelman, Michael, Farming for Profit in a Hungry World; Capital and the Crisis in Agriculture (LandMark Studies, Universe Books: New York, 1977).


North American Agriculture and Food Policies
Rodefeld, Richard, ed., et al., Change in Rural America (The C.V. Mosby Co.: St. Louis, 1978).

Training
All the analysis in the world will do us little good if we feel powerless to change what we see around us. One goal of our re-education process is to develop a sense of personal and collective power and specific skills to bring change about.

Such skills are diverse, wide ranging, and take time and training to acquire. Included among them are the ability to organize campaigns, facilitate meetings, work cooperatively or by consensus, and offer and receive criticism in a supportive manner. Even the development of a support group—something cited by so many we interviewed—is a skill that requires training to develop. Not surprisingly this type of training is not offered by traditional educational institutions. It is necessary to seek it from groups truly dedicated to change. Some of the groups we have had contact with are:

Movement for a New Society, 4722 Baltimore Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19143
Midwest Academy, 600 Fullerton Avenue, Chicago, IL 60606
New School for Democratic Management, 589 Howard Street, San Francisco, CA 94105

Selected Action Groups and their Publications—by Issue

The following list of organizations will give you a sense of the breadth of the growing initiatives of this "food and agricultural movement" we are part of. It is not a movement in any organized sense but a more and more conscious network of people who recognize that food security will only be achieved by working toward the democratic control over our food system.

U.S. Agricultural Policies
1. Agribusiness Accountability Publications, 3410 19th Street, San Francisco, CA 94110, 415/665-6970. Publications: AgBiz Tiller (periodical); Major U.S. Corporations Involved in Agribusiness (1978 edition); The Agribusiness Accountability Project Reader; The Fields Have Turned Brown (Susan DeMarco and Susan Sechler); clipping service.
3. American Agricultural Women, 6690 Walker Avenue N.W., Grand Rapids, MI 49504.
8. Frank Porter Graham Center, Route 3, Box 95, Wadesboro, NC 28170.
13 National Land for People, 2348 North Cornelia, Fresno, CA 93711, 209/237-6516. Publications: People, Land, Food (monthly); Who Owns the Land (monograph); slide show available.
15. U.S. Farmers Association, P.O. Box 496, Hampton, IA 50441.

Direct Farmer-Consumer Marketing
1. Agricultural Marketing Project, Center for Health Services, 2606 Westwood Drive, Nashville, TN 37204.
3. Pike Place Market, 84 Pine Street, Seattle, WA 98101.

Alternative Food Systems
2. CC Grains Collective Warehouse, 4501 Shilshole Avenue N.W., Seattle, WA 98107.
3. Chicago Loop College, Food Co-op Project, 64 East Lake Street, Chicago, IL 60601.
5. DANCE, 1401 South 5th Street, Minneapolis, MN 55404.
6. Earthwork (see #2, Direct Farmer-Consumer Marketing).
7. Federation of Ohio River Co-ops, 320-D Outerbelt Street, Columbus, OH 43213, 614/861-2446. Publication: The Lovin’ FORCfyll, 723 College Avenue, Morgantown, WV 26505.
8. Federation of Southern Cooperatives, P.O. Box 95, Epes, AL 35460.
9. Leon County Food Co-op Warehouse, 649 West Gaines Street, Tallahassee, FL 32304, 904/222-9916.
10. NEFCO, 8 Ashford, Allston, MA 02134, 617/A-Living.

Building Alliances—Farmer, Food Worker, Consumer
1. Consumers Federation, 5516 South Cornell, Chicago IL 60637. Contact: Dan McCurry.
2. Earthwork (see #2, Direct Farmer-Consumer Marketing).
3. Coordinating Committee on Pesticides, #106-1057 Solano Avenue, Albany, CA 94706, 415/526-7141.

Local and Regional Focus
1. California Food Policy Coalition, 1300 North Street, Sacramento, CA 95814.
2. Center for Farm and Food Research, Inc., P.O. Box 166, Cornwall Bridge, CT 06754.
3. Center for Studies in Food Self-Sufficiency, Vermont Institute of Community Involvement, 90 Main Street, Burlington, VT 05401.
4. Coalition for Alternative Agriculture and Self-Sufficiency, c/o SCER, Campus Center Box 18, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, 413/545-2892.
5. Conference on Alternative State and Local Public Policy, 1901 Q Street N.W., Washington, DC 20009.
6. Coordinating Committee on Pesticides (see #3, Building Alliances—Farmer, Food Worker, Consumer).
7. Frank Porter Graham Center (see #8, U.S. Agricultural Policies).

Problems of Farmworkers and Food Workers
2. Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC), 714½ South St. Clair Street, Toledo, OH 43609, 419/243-3456. FLOC is a union of people organized to work for the betterment of migrant farmworkers. FLOC has called an international boycott of all products made by Campbell’s Soup and the Nestlé Company.
3. Northwest Seasonal Workers Association, 145 N. Oakdale Street, Medford, OR 97501, 503/773-6811.
4. United Farmworkers (AFL-CIO), P.O. Box 62, Keene, CA 93531, 805/822-5571.

Agricultural Research: Critiques and Alternatives
1. California Agrarian Action Project (see #1, Problems of Farmworkers and Food Workers).
2. Center for the Biology of Natural Systems, Box 1126, Washington University, St. Louis, MO 63130, 314/863-4812.
3. Institute for Local Self-Reliance (see #9, Local and Regional Focus).

Nutritional Decline, Government Food Programs, and Corporate Penetration of Institutional Food Systems
5. Mississippi Hunger Coalition, 406 Guidici Street, Jackson, MS 39204, 601/948-3672.

The Media and Food/Hunger
1. Action for Children’s Television, 46 Austin Street, Newtonville, MA 02160, 617/527-7870.
2. Food Media Center, c/o Earthwork (see #2, Direct Farmer-Consumer Marketing).


Development, Trade and Government Aid


U.S. Corporate Penetration in the Third World

1. Corporate Accountability Research Group, P.O. Box 19312, Washington, DC 20036, 202/387-8030. Publication: Multinational Monitor (monthly).


3. INFAC, The Newman Center, 1701 University Avenue S.E., Minneapolis, MN 55414, 612/331-3437.

4. Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, #566-475 Riverside Drive, New York, NY 18027, 212/ 870-2294. Film: Bottle Babies (see question 38).


Ending U.S. Government Economic and Military Support to Anti-Democratic Regimes

1. Anti-Martial Law Coalition (Philippines), 41-32 56th Street, Woodside, NY 11377.

2. Clergy and Laity Concerned, (see #7, Development, Trade, and Government Aid).


5. National Network in Solidarity with the Nicaraguan People, 1322 18th
Street N.W., Washington, DC 20036, 202/223-9279.

6. Non-Intervention in Chile (NICH) (national office), #905-151 West 19th Street, New York, NY 10011, 212/989-5695.

Direct Assistance to Self-Help Efforts Abroad

2. Economic Development Bureau, 234 Colony Road, New Haven, CT 06511, 203/776-9084. An alternative to corporate consulting services, the EDB puts people with technical skills in touch with progressive Third World groups.


4. Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, Inc., 78 Beacon Street, Boston, MA 02108, 617/742-2120. Publication: A hunger action study kit.

Other Organizations


Canadian Organizations
1. Canadian Council for International Cooperation (national office), 75 Sparks Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5A5, 613/235-4331.

2. Development Education Center, 121 Avenue Road, Toronto, Ontario.


5. IDEA Center, Box 32, Station C, Winnipeg, Manitoba R3M 3S3.

6. IDERA, 2524 Cypress Avenue, Vancouver, British Columbia, 602/732-1214.

7. National Farmer's Union (national), 250 C 2nd Avenue, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7K 2M1, 306/652-9465.

8. One Sky Center, 134 Avenue F South, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7M 1S8, 306/652-1571.


About the Institute . . .

The Institute for Food and Development Policy is a not-for-profit research, documentation and education center. It focuses on food and agriculture, always asking: Why hunger in a world of plenty?

By working to identify the root causes of hunger and food problems here and abroad, the Institute provides counter messages:

• No country in the world is a hopeless "basket case."
• The illusion of scarcity is a product of the unequal control over food-producing resources; inequality in control over these resources results in their underuse and misuse.
• The hungry are not our enemies. Rather, we and they are victims of the same economic forces which are undercutting their food security as well as ours.

The staff of the Institute: Frances Moore Lappé and Joseph Collins, co-founders, David Kinley, Bruce Randall, Patty Somlo, Douglas Basinger, Rodney Freeland, Chris Anderegg, and Jennifer Lovejoy.

Financial Support

The Institute solicits contributions from individuals, church groups, and private foundations. In addition, monies are received through speaking engagements and literature sales. The Institute does not accept funding from governments or corporations.

More and more, the Institute depends on individual donors, literature sales and speaking engagements. In addition, we are grateful for current contributions from the Arca Foundation, Columbia Foundation, Ottinger Foundation, Samuel Rubin Foundation, Shalan Foundation, Stern Fund, Tides Foundation, The Youth Project, Church of the Brethren, Episcopal Church, Maryknoll Fathers, United Presbyterian Church, First United Church (Oak Park, Illinois), and St. James Episcopal Church (New York).

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Institute Publications

World Hunger: Ten Myths clears the way for each of us to work in appropriate ways to end needless hunger. Frances Moore Lappé and Joseph Collins, revised and updated, 72 pages with photographs, $2.25.

Needless Hunger: Voices from a Bangladesh Village cuts through the paradox of needless hunger to its often brutal political and economic roots. Betsy Hartmann and James Boyce, 72 pages with photographs, $2.95.

Food First Resource Guide, documentation on the roots of world hunger and rural poverty. Institute staff, 80 pages with photographs, $3.00.

Aid to Bangladesh: For Better or Worse?, an interview showing use and abuse of aid throughout Bangladesh. First of Impact Series with Oxfam-America. Michael Scott, 28 pages with photographs, $1.50.

Reprint Packet #1, a compilation of eight articles by Institute staff which have appeared in a wide range of periodicals. 16 pages, $1.50.


Food First Slideshow/Filmstrip, demonstrates that the cause of hunger is not scarcity, but the increasing concentration of control over food-producing resources. 30 minutes, $89 (slideshow), $34 (filmstrip).

Aid as Obstacle: Twenty Questions about our Foreign Aid and the Hungry. Frances Moore Lappé, Joseph Collins and David Kinley. 160 pages, with photographs, $4.95.

What Can We Do? a guide on food and hunger: how you can make a difference. William Valentine and Frances Moore Lappé. 56 pages, with photographs, $2.45.

Write for our free publications catalogue. All publications orders must be prepaid. All booklets are available at generous discount prices for bulk orders. Write for details.
Joseph Collins takes us into the Chilean countryside for a firsthand look at some of the current economic policies and their effect on the rural majority. Collins demonstrates that after five and one-half years of the Pinochet junta’s “counter-agrarian reform,” ever more Chileans face hunger. His straightforward account exposes the system which takes food out of the mouths of the majority while producing luxury commodities for the well-fed.

This report is being used by groups who are documenting the Chilean reality before the United Nations.

Dr. Collins has traveled to Chile extensively over the past twenty years. He is co-founder of the Institute for Food and Development Policy in San Francisco, California. He is author of Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity (co-author Frances Moore Lappé with Cary Fowler) (Ballantine, 1979), World Hunger: Ten Myths (co-author Frances Moore Lappé), and Aid as Obstacle: Twenty Questions about our Foreign Aid and the Hungry (co-authors Frances Moore Lappé and David Kinley).